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Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism? 
 
Abstract 
If scientists embrace scientific realism, they can use a scientific theory to explain and predict 
observables and unobservables. If, however, they embrace scientific antirealism, they cannot 
use a scientific theory to explain observables and unobservables, and cannot use a scientific 
theory to predict unobservables. Given that explanation and prediction are means to make 
scientific progress, scientists can make more scientific progress, if they embrace scientific 
realism than if they embrace scientific antirealism.  
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This paper concerns the two kinds of scientific progress: theoretical and empirical.
1
 Science 
makes theoretical progress when a new theory comes closer to the truth than an old theory, 
and empirical progress when a new theory comes closer to empirical adequacy than an old 
theory. T1 is closer to empirical adequacy than T2, for example, if 90% and 80% of the 
observational consequences of T1 and T2 are true, respectively. An interesting question arises: 
Should scientists be scientific realists or antirealists in order to make theoretical and 
empirical progress? 
We conduct cost-benefit analyses in our daily lives when we face two competing 
courses of action. Suppose, for example, that we have the goal of having fun over the 
weekend by going on a trip, and that we have the option of going to Las Vegas and the option 
of going to the Grand Canyon. In such a situation, we perform the cost-benefit analyses of the 
two options, i.e., we imagine what the costs and benefits of going to Las Vegas and to the 
Grand Canyon would be. After comparing the costs and benefits, we make a final judgment 
about whether to go to Las Vegas or to the Grand Canyon. To say that we should choose Las 
Vegas over the Grand Canyon means that the net benefit of going to Las Vegas outweighs 
that of going to the Grand Canyon. 
Similarly, suppose that scientists have the goal of making scientific progress, i.e., that 
they have the goal to be closer to truths and empirical adequacy than before. Should they be 
realists or antirealists? To answer this question, they should conduct cost-benefit analyses of 
being realists and of being antirealists, i.e., they should imagine what the costs and the 
benefits of being realists and of being antirealists would be. After comparing the costs and the 
benefits, they should make the final judgment about whether to be realists or antirealists. This 
paper focuses on epistemic costs and benefits, aiming to show that scientists should embrace 
realism over antirealism, i.e., that the net epistemic benefit of being realists outweighs that of 
                                            
1
 This paper does not address methodological progress, given that the relevant discourse about it can be 
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being antirealists. 
My discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I display the costs and the benefits of 
the important versions of realism and antirealism vis-à-vis scientific revolutions, arguing that 
realists have no more reason to resist scientific revolutions than antirealists, and vice versa. In 
Section 3, I apply the cost-benefit analyses to the debate between Ernst Mach (1838-1916) 
and Max Planck (1858-1947) over whether scientists should be realists or instrumentalists. I 
argue that Mach overlooked what realists gain from scientific revolutions, and that Planck 
overlooked what instrumentalists gain. In Section 4, I provide reasons for thinking that 
realism is more effective for achieving scientific progress than antirealism is, and hence that 
scientists should choose realism over antirealism. 
This paper operates under the following two assumptions: First, there will be scientific 
revolutions, as there were before the early twentieth century. This assumption is 
controversial. P. Kyle Stanford (2006: 19–20) and K. Brad Wray (2013: 4329) affirm it. By 
contrast, Seungbae Park (2016a) denies it, arguing that scientific revolutions will be rare as in 
the twentieth century. Second, new theories are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than 
old theories. So science progresses through scientific revolutions. This assumption is also 
controversial. While Wray (2007: 86) denies it, Moti Mizrahi (2013), Seungbae Park (2014a: 
270), and Juha Saatsi (2015) affirm it. The main thesis of this paper would collapse without 
these two assumptions. Any objection that readers will raise against them should be 
addressed in separate papers. 
 
2. Cost-Benefit Analyses 
2.1. Truth vs. Empirical Adequacy 
Suppose that realism and antirealism are defined as the views, respectively, that successful 
theories are true
2
 and empirically adequate.
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 So before scientific revolutions, realists believed 
that old theories were true. After scientific revolutions, they believe that the old theories were 
false, and that the new theories are true. Analogously, before scientific revolutions, 
antirealists believed that old theories were empirically adequate. After scientific revolutions, 
they believe that the old theories were empirically inadequate, and that the new theories are 
empirically adequate. 
Under this condition, who would be more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions? 
To answer this question, we need to consider what realists and antirealists lose and gain as a 
result of scientific revolutions. Realists lose their old belief that old theories were true, but 
they get new theories which are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than the old theories, 
i.e., they gain both theoretical and empirical progress. In contrast, antirealists lose their old 
belief that old theories were empirically adequate, but they get new theories which are closer 
to empirical adequacy than the old theories, i.e., they gain empirical progress. To put it 
roughly, after a scientific revolution, realists lose a lot but gain a lot, while antirealists lose a 
little but gain a little. Therefore, it is not clear who would be more motivated to resist 
scientific revolutions.  
Antirealists might contend that it is better to lose a little and gain a little than to lose a 
lot and gain a lot. Epistemic security is more important than anything else, so a big loss 
outweighs a big gain, a small loss also outweighs a small gain, and even a small loss 
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 Extensional realists (Park, 2016b: 47) believe that a scientific theory is true, once they think that scientists’ 
arguments for it are strong. 
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 Bas van Fraassen (1985: 294) and Wray (2008: 321; 2012: 376) claim that successful theories are empirically 
adequate. Mario Alai interprets constructive empiricism as claiming that “all we need to believe is that a theory 
is empirically adequate” (2017: 21). 
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outweighs a big gain. Realists have no theoretical resource to persuade antirealists. 
Consider, however, that Cartesian skeptics can raise the same objection to antirealists. 
Cartesian skeptics believe that none of what successful theories say about the world is worthy 
of our beliefs. They argue that epistemic security is more important than anything else, so it is 
better to lose nothing and gain nothing than to lose a little and gain a little. Antirealists have 
no theoretical resource to persuade Cartesian skeptics. 
A moral is that it is merely a matter of taste whether one chooses to lose a lot and gain 
a lot, or chooses to lose a little and gain a little. No rational argumentation can persuade 
realists or antirealists one way or the other. If realists and antirealists claim that their position 
is better than that of their opponents, they are merely expressing their different tastes. 
A referee raises the following interesting issue. Von Neumann and Dirac’s version of 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics competes with many-worlds interpretation 
and Bohmian mechanics. The three competitors make radically distinct claims about 
unobservables but the same claims about observables. Realists should demonstrate the 
superiority of one competitor over the others before they believe that it is true. By contrast, 
antirealists do not have to because they only believe that the observational claims of the three 
competitors are true. Which of the three competitors should realists choose? 
The aim of this paper is not to solve the problem of underdetermination in quantum 
mechanics but to establish the modest thesis that realism is a better means than antirealism 
for making scientific progress. The modest thesis does not require that realists should 
adjudicate among the three competitors. Consider that antirealists should also choose one 
among the three rivals to make predictions about observables. If they choose von Neumann 
and Dirac’s version and then believe that it is empirically adequate, realists can also choose it 
and then believe that it is true. Of course, the realist belief is more likely to be false than the 
antirealist belief. But the main thesis of this section remains unscathed that realists are no less 
favorable than antirealists to the scientific revolution that will oust all the three competitors. 
 
2.2. Approximate Truth vs. Approximate Empirical Adequacy 
Suppose that realists and antirealists believe, respectively, that successful theories are 
approximately true and approximately empirically adequate. A theory is approximately 
empirically adequate when most of its observational consequences are true (Park, 2009: 117, 
footnote). Realists and antirealists might retreat to approximate truth and approximate 
empirical adequacy, respectively, in response to the pessimistic induction, which maintains 
that since past theories turned out to be false and empirically inadequate, present theories will 
also turn out to be false and empirically inadequate (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160; Mach, 1911: 
17; Laudan 1977: 126; Putnam, 1978: 25). 
Before scientific revolutions, realists believed that old theories were approximately 
true. After scientific revolutions, they believe that both old and new theories are 
approximately true, but that the new theories are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than 
the old theories were. Similarly, before scientific revolutions, antirealists believed that old 
theories were approximately empirically adequate. After scientific revolutions, they believe 
that both old and new theories are approximately empirically adequate, and that the new 
theories are closer to empirical adequacy than the old theories were. 
Is it possible to believe that both old and new theories are approximately true, and that 
the new theories are closer to truths than the old theories were? Wray (2008: 323) and 
Mizrahi (2013: 401) would say yes. They distinguish between being close to the truth and 
being closer to the truth than a competitor. Their distinction can be illuminated with the 
following analogy. Suppose that you and I are in a marathon race from Paris to Berlin, that 
you and I are almost in Berlin, and that you are one step ahead of me. In such a situation, you 
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and I are both close to Berlin, but you are closer to Berlin than I am. Similarly, it is possible 
that both T1 and T2 are close to the truth, i.e., they are both approximately true, and yet T1 is 
closer to the truth than T2 is. It is not the case that if both T1 and T2 are approximately true, T1 
cannot be closer to the truth than T2 is. Analogously, it is possible that both old and new 
theories are approximately empirically adequate, and that the new theories are closer to 
empirical adequacy than the old theories were.  
Under this condition, who would be more open-minded to new theories? Again, to 
answer this question, we need to examine what realists and antirealists lose and gain as a 
result of scientific revolutions. Realists have nothing to lose. As Philip Kitcher (1993: 140–
149) and Stathis Psillos (1999: 113) argue, some theoretical constituents of past theories were 
carried over to present theories after scientific revolutions, so past theories can be said to be 
approximately true. Their position is called ‘selective realism’ and ‘preservative realism’ in 
the literature. Thus, realists can retain their belief that old theories were approximately true. 
Antirealists have nothing to lose either. The fact that the phlogiston theory and the caloric 
theory clashed with empirical anomalies does not refute the weak position that they are 
approximately empirically adequate, although it does refute the strong position that they are 
empirically adequate. Thus, antirealists can retain their old belief that old theories were 
approximately empirically adequate. Now, who gains more from scientific revolutions? 
Realists gain both theoretical and empirical progress, whereas antirealists gain only empirical 
progress. It follows that overall, realists have a stronger reason for supporting scientific 
revolutions than antirealists do.  
 
2.3. Truth vs. Usefulness 
Suppose that realists believe that successful theories are true, and that instrumentalists believe 
that they are useful.
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 On the instrumentalist account, successful theories “are simply tools or 
instruments for making empirical predictions and achieving other practical ends” (Stanford, 
2006: 189). Instrumentalists do not believe that successful theories are true, although they 
believe that the observational consequences of successful theories are true. 
Before we compare the advantages and disadvantages of realism with those of 
instrumentalism, we need to be clear about what exactly instrumentalists are committed to. 
They are committed either to the view that successful theories are empirically adequate or to 
the view that they are approximately empirically adequate. They cannot hold the view that 
successful theories are less than approximately empirically adequate. After all, if most of the 
observational consequences of a theory are false, it is not clear how it can be useful for 
making predictions and manipulations. 
Under this condition, who would be more receptive to new theories? Suppose that 
instrumentalists are committed to the position that successful theories are empirically 
adequate. It is not clear whether instrumentalists would be more supportive of scientific 
revolutions than realists, as we have already seen in Section 2.2. Realists lose a lot but gain a 
lot, whereas instrumentalists lose a little but gain a little from scientific revolutions. Suppose 
that instrumentalists are committed to the position that successful theories are approximately 
empirically adequate. It is not clear either who would be more open-minded to new theories. 
Realists lose their old belief that old theories were true. Instrumentalists do not lose their old 
belief that old theories were approximately empirically adequate. But realists gain both 
theoretical and empirical progress. Instrumentalists gain only empirical progress. It is not 
clear how we can compare the weight of the realist loss of their belief with the weight of the 
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instrumentalist failure to gain theoretical progress. 
In sum, it does not matter whether instrumentalists are committed to the position that 
successful theories are empirically adequate or to the position that they are approximately 
empirically adequate. It is difficult to determine who would be more motivated to welcome or 
unwelcome scientific revolutions. 
 
3. Debate between Mach and Planck 
This section applies the preceding cost-benefit analyses to the debate between Mach and 
Planck over whether realism or instrumentalism was better for scientific progress. Mach 
maintained that instrumentalism is more beneficial to scientific progress; Planck maintained 
that realism is more beneficial to scientific progress. The cost-benefit analyses indicate, 
however, that their arguments are all flawed, as will become clear in this section. 
Mach accused realism of hindering the advent of new theories. He observed that 
realists are dogmatic about old theories and hesitant to entertain new theories. He says that 
whoever “knows only one view or one form of a view does not believe that another has ever 
stood in its place, or that another will ever succeed it; he neither doubts nor tests” (Mach, 
1911: 17). In short, realism has the disadvantage of impeding scientific revolutions by 
making scientists believe that old theories are true.  
In my view, however, we should expose the advantage, as well as the disadvantage, of 
realism. The advantage of realism is that as a result of scientific revolutions, scientists are 
closer to truths than before. In addition, we should compare the advantage and the 
disadvantage of realism with those of instrumentalism before we make the final choice 
between realism and instrumentalism. Instrumentalism has an advantage, viz., as a result of 
scientific revolutions, scientists are closer to empirical adequacy than before. But it has a 
disadvantage, viz., as a result of scientific revolutions, scientists lose their old belief that old 
theories are empirically adequate. Again, realism makes scientists lose a lot but gain a lot, 
whereas instrumentalism makes scientists lose a little but gain a little. Given this cost-benefit 
analysis of realism and instrumentalism, it is not clear which is better in terms of making 
scientists open-minded.  
Mach might reply that instrumentalists believe that successful theories are not 
empirically adequate but approximately empirically adequate. So they do not lose their belief 
that old theories are approximately empirically adequate. Realists would reply, however, that 
they believe that successful theories are not true but approximately true. So they do not lose 
their belief either that old theories are approximately true. Hence, retreating to approximate 
empirical adequacy does not make instrumentalism more congenial than realism to the advent 
of new theories. 
Planck accused instrumentalism of making scientists complacent, saying that “the 
physicist, if he wants to promote science, has to be a realist, not an economizer” (Planck, 
1910/1992, 146). His idea is that instrumentalists do not care whether theories are true or 
false. They only care whether theories make true predictions or not. So they are content 
insofar as theories make true predictions, and they do not bother to replace old theories with 
new theories with the view to better representing unobservables. Only realists make such 
efforts. 
Planck’s criticism against instrumentalism is unfair for the following reason. The 
history of science tells us that theories have been getting closer and closer to empirical 
adequacy through scientific revolutions. New theories have broader predictive scopes than 
old theories. As a result, instrumentalists would not settle for old theories, even if they are 
useful to a certain extent. They would be in search of more useful theories, which make more 
true predictions than old theories. In short, empirical progress motivates instrumentalists to 
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replace old theories with new ones. 
In sum, Mach overlooked what realists gain from scientific revolutions, viz., theoretical 
progress, while Planck overlooked what instrumentalists gain from scientific revolutions, 
viz., empirical progress. Neither of them compared both the advantage and the disadvantage 
of his own position with those of his opponent’s position. If they had conducted thorough 
cost-benefit analyses of both realism and instrumentalism, they would not have attacked each 
other’s positions as they did.  
 
4. Explanation and Prediction 
The cost-benefit analyses of realism and antirealism show that it is not clear which position is 
more beneficial to scientific progress. The debate between Mach and Planck does not decide 
this issue. This section aims to tip the scale in favor of realism by invoking the advantages of 
realism over antirealism concerning explanation and prediction. 
Realists believe, but antirealists do not, for example, that the standard model of particle 
physics is (approximately) true. According to the standard model, macro objects like stones 
and trees are composed of atoms. An atom is made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons. 
Protons and neutrons can be further broken down into quarks. All these particles have mass. 
But why do they have mass? The standard model says that they have mass because they 
interact with the Higgs field. If the Higgs field were turned off, they would become massless 
and move at the speed of light. Thus, the Higgs field is what makes them have mass, slow 
down, and form atoms. 
Imagine that antirealists say, “A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs 
field, but I don’t believe a stone interacts with the Higgs field.” They say, “A stone has mass 
because it interacts with the Higgs field” to explain why a stone has mass. They add, “I don’t 
believe a stone interacts with the Higgs field” to express their antirealist commitment that 
unobservables, including the Higgs field, are not worthy of our belief. Their sentence, 
however, sounds odd. Why does it sound odd? It involves Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox 
occurs when we say any sentence that takes the form, “P, but I don’t believe p” or “P, but I 
believe not p” (Moore, 1993: 207–212).  
Moore’s paradox stems from the gap between what we speak and what we believe 
(Park, 2014b). Antirealists say, “A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field,” 
when they do not believe that a stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. Their 
speech act does not match up with their doxastic state. So they are caught in Moore’s 
paradox. By contrast, realists’ speech act matches up with their doxastic state. They say, “A 
stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field” in accordance with their belief that a 
stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. So they are free from Moore’s 
paradox (Park, 2016c: 77–78). Suppose that antirealists say, “A stone has mass because it 
interacts with the Higgs field,” but they do not declare to their audience that they do not 
believe that a stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. In such a case, their 
audience may ask them disconcerting questions: “Do you believe what you just said? If you 
don’t, why should I believe what you don’t? How can you say to me what you don’t believe? 
Do you expect me to believe what you don’t?” Antirealists owe us answers to these 
questions. 
Antirealists run into Moore’s paradox or the disconcerting questions not only when 
they explain observables but also when they explain unobservables. Consider the explanation 
that a proton has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. The explanandum – a proton 
has mass – is not observable. Antirealists cannot explain such an explanandum due to 
Moore’s paradox and the disconcerting questions.  
Set aside these problems. Antirealists would not bother to explain why an unobservable 
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fact is as a scientific theory says it is, for their beliefs are restricted to observables. They 
would think that it is a waste of time to ask and explain why a proton has mass, just as you 
would think that it is a waste of time to ask and explain why a unicorn has one horn as 
opposed to two horns, if you believe that a unicorn does not exist. In general, we do not take 
an explanation seriously, if we do not believe that its explanandum exists. 
Let me turn to the issue of prediction. Moore’s paradox does not arise when antirealists 
predict an observable fact, but it arises when they predict an unobservable fact. The standard 
model predicts that if the Higgs field were turned off, a stone and a proton would become 
massless and their constituent particles would travel at the speed of light. Antirealists can say, 
“If the Higgs field were turned off, a stone would become massless.” Such a prediction does 
not require that antirealists believe that the standard model is true. But how about the 
prediction that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless? This 
prediction is not a prediction of an observable fact but a prediction of an unobservable fact. 
Antirealists cannot give such a prediction, for they would be caught in Moore’s paradox. 
They would have to say, “If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become 
massless, but I don’t believe if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become 
massless.”  
In response, antirealists might appeal to van Fraassen’s (1980) distinction between 
belief and acceptance. According to him, antirealists do not believe T, but they accept T. They 
do not believe, for example, that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become 
massless, but they accept that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become 
massless. So it is legitimate for antirealists to say, “If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton 
would become massless.” In short, antirealists can talk as if they are realists because they 
accept T. It appears therefore that van Fraassen’s notion of acceptance enables antirealists to 
predict an unobservable fact by invoking another unobservable fact.  
It is not clear, however, whether van Fraassen’s distinction between belief and 
acceptance is tenable or not. Van Fraassen claims that there is a mental difference between 
realists who believe T and antirealists who accept T. The mental difference is that realists 
believe that T is true, while antirealists believe that it is empirically adequate. There is, 
however, no verbal difference between them, i.e., antirealists talk exactly as realists do, as we 
noted above. However, the absence of the verbal difference between them gives rise to the 
suspicion that there is no mental difference between them either, i.e., antirealists believe T, as 
realists do. In other words, if antirealists say everything that realists say and vice versa, we 
have no reason for thinking that the putative mental difference between them exists. Thus, 
antirealists have the burden to flesh out a non-mental difference between realists and 
antirealists that stems from the alleged mental difference between them. In other words, they 
need to make it explicit what it is that realists can do but antirealists cannot due to the fact 
that realists believe T while antirealists accept T. 
Even if antirealists successfully cash out a non-mental difference between realists and 
antirealists, they cannot still escape from Moore’s paradox. Imagine that antirealists accept 
the standard model and then say, “(1) If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would 
become massless, (2) but I don’t believe if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would 
become massless, (3) but I accept if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become 
massless.” Antirealists say (1) to make the prediction and (2) to express antirealism. Note that 
they are caught in Moore’s paradox. Therefore, it does not matter whether van Fraassen’s 
notion of acceptance is coherent or not. Antirealists are not free from Moore’s paradox.5 
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Explanatory power and predictive power are virtues of scientific theories that scientists 
use to choose a theory over its competitors. Other things being equal, scientists choose T1 
over T2, if T1 has higher explanatory power or predictive power than T2. The discussion 
above shows, however, that Moore’s paradox or the disconcerting questions prevent 
antirealists from using scientific theories to explain observables and unobservables, and to 
predict unobservables. So if scientists embrace realism over antirealism, they can fully use 
explanations and predictions as means to make scientific progress. By contrast, if they 
embrace antirealism, they cannot.  
Antirealists might object that I have appealed to explanatory power and predictive 
power to support realism, thereby begging the question against them. One of the key 
disagreements between realists and antirealists is whether explanations and predictions can 
provide warrant for a theory.  Realists say yes; antirealists say no. I cannot resolve the dispute 
between them by appealing to the realist position.  
The preceding objection, however, commits the straw man fallacy. Nowhere does this 
paper assume that explanations and predictions provide warrant for a theory. This paper only 
assumes that when T1 explains or predicts more phenomena than T2, we are justified in 
believing that T1 is closer to the truth than T2, while remaining neutral as to whether we are 
justified in believing that T1 is (approximately) true. Recall that I stated in Section 1 that this 
paper operates under the assumption that new theories are closer to truths than old theories.  
This modest assumption is very different from the ambitious assumption that new 
theories are (approximately) true, as Wray (2008: 323) and Mizrahi (2013: 401) observe. To 
use the analogy in Section 2.2, you can be closer to Berlin than I am, even if you are far from 
Berlin. So it is one thing to say that new theories are (approximately) true; it is quite another 
to say that new theories are closer to truths than old theories. Even if we grant for the sake of 
argument that antirealists have demolished the former thesis in the literature, it does not 
follow that they have thereby demolished the latter thesis. It is much harder to refute the latter 
thesis than the former thesis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
If realists were more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions than antirealists, realism 
would be the better means to achieve scientific progress than antirealism, and scientists 
would have to be realists. By contrast, if antirealists were more motivated to welcome 
scientific revolutions than realists, antirealism would be the better means to achieve scientific 
progress than realism, and scientists would have to be antirealists.  
The cost-benefit analyses of realism and antirealism show, however, that realists lose a 
lot but gain a lot, while antirealists lose a little but gain a little, as a result of scientific 
revolutions. Hence, it is hard to tell who would be more motivated to welcome scientific 
revolutions, and the cost-benefit analyses do not yield guidance as to whether scientists 
should be realists or antirealists.  
The examination of the doxastic requirement of scientific explanation and prediction 
shows, however, that realists can use a scientific theory to explain and predict both 
observables and unobservables. By contrast, antirealists cannot use a scientific theory to 
explain something, whether that thing is observable or unobservable. Nor can they use a 
scientific theory to predict unobservables. They can only use it to predict observables. For 
this reason, realism is a better means than antirealism for scientists to make scientific 
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